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Because the environment is being seriously threatened by over-
population, overdevelopment, and pollution, there has been an in-
creasing awareness of dhe need to control land usage through com-
prehensive regional planning. While California has failed to ef-
fectively respond to that need in the past, it appears that the Legis-
lature is now moving in that direction and the establishment of at
least some comprehensive regional planning agencies is imminent.
In this article, the authors discuss various approaches to regional
planning, problems of enforcement of regional plans, and alterna-
tives available for controlling the regional planning process. The
authors conclude dheir analysis by setting forth recommendations
for basic criteria necessary for effective regional planning legislation
in 1973.
Schemes lightly made come to nothing,
but with long planning they succeed.
Proverbs 15:22
In this, the age of the "quiet revolution in land use control,"' when
regional planning agencies are being established to cope with many
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1. F. BOSSELMAN AND D. CALLMS, QUIET REVOLUTION IN LANn USE CoNTROL
5 (1971). This book describes emerging state and regional land use control agencies
in several states.
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serious environmental problems,' when local agency formation com-
missions are regulating local boundaries in an attempt to control urban
sprawl,' and when the Legislature is mandating an increasing number
of local planning responsibilities,4 California is faced with a bewildering
number of conflicting planning jurisdictions, none of which have
the responsibility or the capability to adequately carry out comprehen-
sive regional planning. While several existing state laws permit the es-
tablishment of regional planning agencies, these laws are cumbersome
and the agencies that they authorize, if created, would be virtually
ineffectual. Therefore, the comprehensive regional planning that has
been accomplished thus far has been the result of actions taken by
voluntary associations of governments (also called councils of gov-
ernments) which have been organized under very general enabling acts.
Although the output of such associations has varied in quality, none of
their regional plans are directly enforceable, nor are any of the associa-
tions under an obligation to perform any particular kind of planning
(except as a condition for federal grants).
From the foregoing, it would appear that the state, by failing to
enact comprehensive regional planning laws, has abdicated its respon-
sibility to federal and local governments. However, considerable
state legislative activity in the field of regional planning is currently
taking place and it may be expected that legislation will be enacted
in the near future which will establish comprehensive regional planning
agencies in several areas of California. In view of the imminent enact-
ment of such legislation, this article will analyze the existing need and
requirements for regional planning and regulation, the lack of effec-
tive state involvement, the alternative methods of organizing regional
agencies, and the methods of enforcing regional plans. Finally, sug-
gested criteria for regional planning legislation in the 1973 session
will be proposed.
Present Requirements for Regional Planning
and Control
A. General Considerations
Much has been written in recent years about the need for regional
2. E.g., San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, CAL.
GOV'T CODE §66600 et seq.; Regional Water Quality Control Boards, CAL. WATER CODE
§13200 et seq.
3. J. GOLDBACH, BOUNDARY CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA: THE LOCAL AGENCY FOR-
MATION COMMISSIONS 50 (1970). The author contends that local agency formation
commissions have obtained a "slippery hold on general planning for the county as a
region."
4. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §65302, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 65, at
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planning in large urban (and even rural) areas. These areas, which
are presently fragmented into hundreds of small, overlapping, often
single-purpose entities, provide services and regulate private activity
with little concern for their respective impact on the remainder of the
region. 5 The clich6 that air pollution, traffic congestion, and urban
blight do not respect municipal boundaries is indicative of this unfor-
tunate situation. For example, the San Francisco Bay Area consists of
9 counties, 92 cities,6 and 508 independent special districts,7 all of
which influence regional development in one way or another. Many
decisions which are advantageous to any one of these decision-making
entities may be very disadvantageous to the region at large. Yet, over
the years, this problem has been recognized only to the extent of cer-
tain functions, such as air pollution, water pollution, bay fill control
and coastline protection. In these areas the response has been to cre-
ate single-purpose regional planning agencies." However, the prolif-
eration of such regional agencies has itself caused a fragmented plan-
ning process with each component making plans based solely on the
perspective of its own functional responsibilities and geographical lim-
itations. Therefore, it has been increasingly recognized that a perma-
nent regulatory structure is needed to manage the conflicts among
the various planning and implementing agencies and to formulate com-
prehensive plans to guide the development of the respective regionsY
B. Federal Requirements for Regional Planning
Many federal grant-in-aid programs condition federal aid to local
or state agencies upon the existence of a regional plan for the area in
which the grant is to be made. For example, in order for aid to be
given for open space preservation or for water and sewer projects
(which, because of a state bond issue, are 80% matching grants) ",
80, c. 717, at 1343, c. 1353, at 2517, c. 1590, at 3310; CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 775, at 1524,
c. 1632, at 3513, c. 1803 at 3900; CAL. Gov'T CODE §65302.1, enacted CAL. STATS.
1971, c. 1026, at 1972.
5. E.g., R. WARREN, GOVERNMENT IN METRoPoLITAN REGIONS: A REAPPRA sAL
OF FRACnONATiED PoLiTcAL ORGANIZATION (1966).
6. E. BROWN, CAIFORNmI RosTER (1971) (Roster of California government of-
ficials published by the Secretary of State).
7. CONTROLLER'S ANNuAL REPORT OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING
SPECIAL DISTRICTS (Fiscal Year 1969-70). The Los Angeles region has 795 special dis-
tricts. These figures do not include school districts.
8. E.g., BOSSELMAN AND CALLIES, supra note 2, at 109.
9. E.g., S. ScoTT AND H. NATHAN, ADAPTING GOVERNMENT TO REGIONAL NEEDS:
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON BAY AREA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION (1970); TowARD
A BAY AREA REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE (1968); S. Sco-r
AND J. BOLLENS, GOVERNING A METROPOLITAN REGION: T=E SAN FRANCISCO BAY
AREA (1968).
10. See Legislative Analyst's analysis in Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
-Propositions and Proposed Laws, Together with Arguments, General Election,
Tuesday, Nov. 3, 1970, at 3 (available from the office of the Secretary of State).
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there must be an areawide planning process through which a plan
containing housing, water and sewer, and opeA space elements has
been developed.11
A second example of federally conditioned grants is the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 197212 containing a very strong re-
gional planning requirement. The governor of each state is required
to identify industrial areas within his state which have substantial water
quality control problems. He then must designate a planning agency
within each such area, which includes on its governing body local elected
officials or their designees. 13 If the governor fails to act, local officials
can appeal to the federal government for recognition of a planning ag-
ency.14 There is strong incentive for the designation of these agencies,
since the federal government will pay 100% of their planning costs16
and large federal matching grants for construction of sewage treat-
ment facilities are conditioned upon conformity of the proposed facili-
ties with the plan formulated by the designated agency. 6
In addition to the conditioning of grants to local and state govern-
ments upon fulfillment of designated regional planning requirements,
the federal government also has grant programs designed to act as in-
centives for regional planning. For example, the "701" planning as-
sistance program, 17 administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, expends one third of its California grant money' 8
in aid to comprehensive regional planning agencies. In order to be eli-
gible for such assistance, a regional planning agency is required to de-
velop a plan which contains a number of elements specified by the
Department. 9 There are also other grant programs which encourage
(but do not require) regional planning for such subjects as health
services,20 older Americans, 21 and public works development. 22
11. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Circulars
MPD 6415.1A, 6415.2A, and 6415.3.
12. Pub. L. No. 92-500 (Oct. 18, 1972).
13. Pub. L. No. 92-500, §208(a) (Oct. 18, 1972).
14. Id. §208(4).
15. Id. §208(f)(2).
16. Id. §204(a)(1). In California, the Regional Water Quality Control Boards
would not qualify for designation under the federal act since their membership does not
contain elected local officials. Therefore, either a comprehensive planning agency or
a single-purpose sewage planning agency, such as the Bay Area Sewage Service Ag-
ency (CAL. WATER CODE §1600 et seq.), would have to be designated.
17. The Housing Act of 1954 §701, 40 U.S.C. §461 (1970).
18. Figures provided by the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations.
19. The Housing Act of 1954 §701(g), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §461(b) (1970).
20. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Act of 1966, 42
U.S.C. §246 (1970).
21. Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §3023 (1970).
22. Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §3121
(1970). Other federal grant programs which encourage regional planning include the
Rural Development Act, §106, Pub. L. No. 92-419 (Aug. 30, 1972), the Safe Streets
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An even stronger incentive was proposed in the National Land
Use Policy Act of 1972.23 This legislation, which passed the Senate but
not the House, would have required states, in order to be eligible for
planning funds, to remove from local control, planning decisions that
have areawide impact. 24 This would have included, according to a
Senate committee analysis, "that 10% of land use decisions which [have
an] impact upon citizens who are not represented by the decision-
maker."25 In order to qualify for funding, the state would have had to
have developed a plan within five years which conformed with the pro-
visions of the Act. Although not expressly stated in the text, it seems that
the intent of this proposed legislation was to allow states to delegate au-
thority for the areawide planning decisions to regional planning agen-
cies.
2 6
It must be noted that although present federal law requires regional
planning to be undertaken, it does not require that the plan that is de-
veloped be enforced. Therefore, the existing structure consisting of
voluntary associations of governments, satisfies the minimum require-
ments of current federal law. If the National Land Use Policy Act is
eventually passed, regional agencies may have to be vested with regu-
latory power in order to be utilized by the state to fulfill the mandate of
the Act.
C. Court Decisions Indicating a Need for
Regional Planning and Control
There has been, to date, no federal or state court decision which
mandates regional planning or land use control based upon constitu-
tional or other nonstatutory grounds, nor is such a decision to be ex-
pected. However, there have been decisions by courts in California
and other jurisdictions which, by utilizing regional standards for eval-
uating local land use regulations, require local regulations to be adopted
within the framework of a comprehensive regional scheme. Regional
Act, 42 U.S.C. §3721 et seq., the Highway Act of 1962, 23 U.S.C. §134 (1971), the
Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §1857c (1971), the Natural Resource Recovery Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §3254a (1971), and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,
§§305, 306, Pub. L. 92-583 (Oct. 27, 1972).
23. S. 632, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIms, S. Rep. No. 92-869, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972);
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS 92ND CONG., 2ND SESS., NATIONAL
LAND USE POLICY BACKGROUND PAPERS (Comm. Print 1972).
24. S. 632, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. §303 (1972).
25. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra
note 23, at 51.
26. See, e.g., The President's message to Congress, Aug. 10, 1970, reprinted in
Hearings on S. 3354, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 518, 526 (1970). It was apparently the intent of the Senate Committee
to give much flexibility to the states in the administration of their land use programs.
Hearings on S. 632, National Land Use Policy, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1971).
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planning, in such situations, becomes indispensable if a locality's land
use control is to be assured validity.
The idea of subjecting local land use regulation to judicial scrutiny
as to its regional as well as local impact was enunciated in dicta in
the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2 7  In
Euclid the U.S. Supreme Court, while upholding Euclid's zoning, and
while presuming the validity of such ordinances, warned that "it is
not meant by this .. . to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the muni-
cipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way."
28
In recent years, several courts have agreed with the Supreme Court's
dicta in Euclid and have struck down zoning which tends to exclude
people (usually those of lower income or racial minorities) from the
community.29 These courts have held that a regional public interest
which indicates a need for low or moderate income housing in a com-
munity cannot be frustrated by the self interest of those already liv-
ing in the community. These cases usually involve a suburban munici-
pality which enacts ordinances tending to limit the migration of new
residents into the community. The courts have found common ele-
ments to these cases: a crucial housing shortage in the region, an in-
creasing trend of blue collar jobs to be located in the suburbs, and a
marked lack of low or moderate-income housing in the suburbs.
An example of a state court which followed Euclid's logic was Oak-
wood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison which stressed the un-
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance as it related to the general wel-
fare of the state and region30 The community, the New Jersey Su-
perior Court said, "must not ignore housing needs of its own popula-
tion and of the region . . . . General welfare does not stop at each
municipal boundary." 31
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, also following Euclid's reason-
ing, overturned a zoning ordinance which made no provision for apart-
ment buildings when the court found that there was a regional need for
that kind of housing in the area of the township.32 The court held
27. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
28. Id. at 390.
29. It has been suggested that courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to in-
voke the traditional judicial presumption of validity for zoning ordinances. Comment,
The General Public Interest v. The Presumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A De-
batable Question 50 J. U"n. L. 129, 132-38 (1972).
30. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison 117 NJ. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (1971).
31. Id. at 20, 283 A.2d 358.
32. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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that the township could not "stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live."3 3  The court further stressed
the need for a planning mechanism to resolve such problems when it in-
dicated that the decision might have been contrary "in an ideal world
[in which] planning and zoning would be done on a regional basis, so
that a given community would have apartments, while an adjoining com-
munity would not."3
Although there has not been a direct holding on the question of ex-
clusionary zoning in California, the supreme court did hold in Scott v.
City of Indian Wells' 5 that a city could not ignore the impact of its zon-
ing on land outside the city and must give adequate notice and the right
to be heard to owners of such property. The court agreed with the
Euclid Court's dicta concerning a city's lack of authority to enact
zoning ordinances contrary to the general welfare of the region.36 The
court went on to say that "in today's sprawling metropolitan com-
plexes, municipal boundary lines rarely indicate where urban devel-
opment ceases. We have come to recognize that local zoning may have
even a regional impact. ' 37 Using this logic, it is possible that the Su-
preme Court of California could, in a proper case, invalidate local
zoning on the basis of regional unreasonableness.
Furthermore, once it is shown that a zoning ordinance is inconsis-
tent with the regional welfare, it is arguable that a court would adopt
a regional plan as its standard and require compliance with that portion
of the plan which relates to the question under consideration. How-
ever, most courts express reluctance at becoming zoning appeals boards
and would probably not attempt to administer regional plans.38
In view of the fact that the judiciary seems willing to void only local
planning that conflicts with regional interest and does not appear
willing to mandate that regional planning must occur, a legislative so-
lution to the need for regional planning appears to be the most promis-
ing approach.
No Effective State Involvement
California has only one mandated comprehensive regional planning
agency-the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 39-which was estab-
33. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d 398.
34. Id. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d 399 n.4.
35. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
36. Id. at 548 n.7, 492 P.2d at 1141 n.7, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749 n.7.
37. Id. at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
38. Comment, Exclusionary Zoning From a Regional Perspective, 1972 URBAN
L. ANNUAL 239, 242.
39. CAL. GOVT CODE §66800.
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lished by an interstate compact between California and Nevada.
40
The agency is comprised of a variety of state and local appointees
from each state;41 it has the authority to enact a regional plan 2 and en-
force it by disapproving local plans and activities;48 and it is financed
by assessments made against the counties in which it is located.44 Other
than the Tahoe agency, the state mandates no comprehensive regional
planning. Most state-mandated planning is done by numerous over-
lapping single-purpose agencies (there are over 100 in the state),"
each with a varying degree of authority to enforce its plan.
40
Although the state has not itself established comprehensive regional
planning agencies, it has enacted several laws which were either de-
signed for the voluntary establishment of such agencies or which have
been used for that purpose.
There are two California laws designed specifically for voluntary for-
mation of regional comprehensive planning agencies: the Regional
Planning Law,47 first enacted in 1953,48 and the District Planning
Law, enacted in 1957.1' While the Regional Planning Law technically
mandates the establishment of planning districts, it provides that the
districts may not function until activated by a resolution of 2/3 of the
counties and 2/3 of the cities in the district which in effect make the
formation of such districts voluntary." Under the law, a district is
to be governed by a board composed of city and county officials and
one citizen-at-large from each county, appointed by the other mem-
bers.0' A district that adopts a plan has no power to enforce it, but
such a district may levy a tax of one half cent on each $100 of assessed
valuation in the district for support of the board.5
2
The District Planning Law, on the other hand, allows counties to
form planning districts by resolution of each county in the proposed
40. Pub. L. 92-148 (Dec. 18, 1969).
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66801 art. IH(a).
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66801 art. V(b).
43. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66801 art. VI(e).
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66801 art. VII(a).
45. CALOIFORNIA CouNciL ON INTERGOvERN mNTAL RELATIONS, DRAFT ON STATE
POLICY ON REGIONAL ORGANIZATnON 2 (Sept. 1, 1972).
46. The State has enacted legislation mandating regional planning by single-pur-
pose agencies in many fields. For example, planning is now required at the regional
level for air pollution control (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §39270 et seq.), water
resources (CAL. WATER CODE §13000 et seq.), transportation in the San Francisco Bay
Area (CAL. GOV'T CODE §66500 et seq.), health services in order to carry out federal
law (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §437.7), conservation of the San Francisco Bay
(CAL. Gov'T CODE §66600 et seq.), and the coastline (CAL. PuB. REsoTRcEs CODE
§27000 et seq.).
47. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65060 et seq., enacted, CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1811, at 3669.
48. CAL. STATS. 1952, c. 1895, at 3691.
49. CAL. GovT CODE §66100 et seq., enacted, CAL. STATS. 1957 c. 2001, at 3561.
50. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65061.4.
51. CAL. GOVT CODE §§65063.1, 65063.5.
52. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§65069.1, 65069.2.
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district. Its governing body is composed entirely of local officials."
Similar to the Regional Planning Law, the District Planning Law pro-
vides no enforcement power and allows a tax rate of one cent on each
$100 of assessed valuation. 4
No district has ever been formed under either of these voluntary
acts, probably because the requirements for formation are onerous and
the resulting agency would have few, if any, powers greater than those
possessed by the now existing voluntary associations of governments.
Consequently, regional planning in California is performed by num-
erous associations of governments, created largely because of strong
federal requirements.5 5  The associations are completely voluntary in
nature and operate under agreements adopted by each of their mem-
bers. Most voluntary associations are formed under what has been called
the Joint Powers Act, 6 which simply provides that any two governmen-
tal entities may, by agreement between them, create an agency (or au-
thority) which may exercise any power common to the contracting
entities. One association which does not utilize the Joint Powers
Act is the Sacramento metropolitan area's association of governments
(the Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission) which utilizes
the Area Planning Commission Law.5 8 This law allows one or more
entities to create a planning commission to plan for matters of com-
mon interest,59 and it is as unstructured as the Joint Powers Act.
The Joint Powers Act and the Area Planning Commission Law are
distinguishable from the Regional Planning Law and the District
Planning Law in that the latter two were designed specifically for re-
gional planning associations while the former two are merely general
association provisions.
Although the associations created by use of the Area Planning Com-
mission Law and the Joint Powers Act have the power under state
law to formulate regional plans and policies, the only enforcement
power they have is derived from the federal government and requires
the existence of a federal grant in the area(s) in which regulation is at-
tempted. In order to exercise this enforcement power, these planning
53. CAL. GoV'T CODE §66201.
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE §66361.
55. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
56. CAL. GOVT CODE §6500 et seq. This act is used not only for planning pur-
poses, but for a wide variety of other purposes, including the provision of centralized
computer facilities and the financing of capital improvements. See Taber and Whittaker,
Joint Powers Revenue Bonds-A Tool for Intergovernmental Cooperation, 23 HAST. LJ.
793 (1972).
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE §6502.
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65600 et seq.
59. Id. at §65601.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4
associations are certified by the federal Office of Management and Bud-
get to act as regional clearinghouses. This designation gives the as-
sociations the responsibility of reviewing federal grant applications by
local agencies to determine whether the applications conform to the re-
gional plan. Section 401 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
of 196860 provides that "to the maximum extent possible, consistent
with national objectives, all federal aid for development purposes shall
be consistent with, and further the objectives of state, regional and
local planning." 6' Therefore, the federal government usually will not
approve a grant for a project which a regional agency finds to be in con-
flict with the regional plan.62 The plan is thus enforced by denial of
federal money to projects in violation of it.
Although associations of governments are granted some enforcement
power by the federal grant review procedure described above, the pres-
ent associations have the following deficiencies:
1. They are voluntary associations and the members are free to
withdraw whenever they choose.
3
2. They have no taxing power64 and must depend on federal grants"6
and voluntary contributions from their own members. 6
3. They have no police power 67 and, except for the grant review
procedure, they must depend on the moral obligation of their mem-
bers to enforce their plans.
4. State law establishes no standards or guidelines for the prepara-
tion of comprehensive regional plans.
Although the federal government has mandated the creation of re-
gional planning agencies and has specified in detail the organization
of such agencies and the contents of their plans, it has not pre-empted
the field; rather it has entered the field only because of the absence of
state action. For example, it is the policy expressed by the Office of
60. Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §4231 (1970).
61. Id.
62. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget Circular
No. A-95, at 9 (Rev. Feb. 9, 1971), requires federal agencies to assure that any
federal plan or project is consistent or compatible with state, regional and local devel-
opment plans and programs identified in the course of consultations. Exceptions will be
made only where there is clear justification.
63. However, if a member withdraws, it is still subject to the association of gov-
ernment's regional plan and the association of governments retains its power to recom-
mend federal grants.
64. Legislative Counsel Opinion No. 3060 (Feb. 19, 1968); Legislative Counsel
Opinion No. 16421 (Oct. 17, 1968) (relating specifically to the property tax).
65. See, e.g., notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
66. Hearings on Regional Planning in the San Francisco Bay Area, Before the Cali-
fornia Senate Committee on Local Government, Apr. 10, 1972, at 32.
67. Letter from Attorney General Thomas Lynch to Phillip G. Simpson, Executive
Assistant to the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations, (Oct. 13, 1972).
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Management and Budget that if a state develops a regional planning
program, the federal government will acceed to it."'
California has to date abdicated its authority to the federal govern-
ment by its inaction. Thus, if California is to have a voice in its own
planning and future development, it is essential that a procedure imple-
menting effective regional planning be adopted.
Enforcement Power of Regional Agencies
In order for effective regional planning to take place, the regional
agency must have some positive police power to enforce its plans and
policies. The advisory agency approach heretofore used by the vol-
untary regional planning agencies has proved itself to be insufficient
to cope with the increased responsibilities which now must be dele-
gated to such agencies. Some form of positive regulatory power, ex-
ercised either directly (the permit power) or indirectly by requiring
the actions of other agencies to be consistent with the regional plan
(planning management), must be granted to any new regional compre-
hensive planning agency.
A. The Advisory Agency Approach
The weakest form of regional agency that the Legislature could man-
date is the advisory agency. Two recent bills would have established
such agencies for two regions in the state. The first was a bill intro-
duced in the 1971 California legislative session which would have cre-
ated a regional planning district encompassing the north coastal coun-
ties.69 This bill passed the Legislature but was vetoed by the Gov-
ernor. The second, a 1972 bill which was introduced but not passed,
would have created a regional planning agency in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area.70  In both bills, the agencies would have had the
power to formulate a regional plan and to review federal grant appli-
cations71 (the same powers now possessed by voluntary associations
68. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95, supra note 62, at 12, states
that one of its objectives is to encourage the states to exercise leadership.in delineat-
ing and establishing a system of planning and development districts or regions in each
state, which can provide a consistent geographic base for the coordination of federal,
state, and local development programs.
69. S.B. 920, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, Nov. 3, 1971. The boundaries
of the regional planning district would have been designated by the Council on Intergov-
ernmental Relations to include at least three of the following counties: Del Norte,
Humboldt, Mendocino, Lake and Sonoma. Id. §67504.
70. S.B. 776, 1972 Regular Session, failed to clear the Senate Government Organi-
zation Committee; S.B. 37, 1972 Regular Session, which was an identical bill, was re-
ferred to interim study by the Senate Committee on Local Government. Hearings on
Regional Planning in Southern California, Before the California Senate Committee on
Local Government, Sept. 15, 1972.
71. S.B. 37 and S.B. 776, 1972 Regular Session, §67635 (identical bills); S.B.
920, 1971 Regular Session, §67528.
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of governments), but no further enforcement powers would have been
granted. 72 However, the contemplated agencies would have had two
advantages over the present association of governments approach: (1)
local agencies could not have withdrawn from the prescribed jurisdic-
tion of the agency; and (2) each agency would have had its own mod-
est taxing or member assessment power.7 3  This would free the ag-
ency from having to rely on voluntary member contributions.74 Since
no new control powers were to have been granted under this form of
organization, there is no need for legislation of this type unless, as in
the case of Los Angeles and the North Coast, there are or would be
problems in maintaining the voluntary membership of local agen-
cies in the association.75  The fact that these bills merely require mem-
bership in a planning organization was pointed out by the Governor
in his veto message on the north coast bill in which he said that there
is no need to mandate upon local agencies that which they could al-
ready do voluntarily.7
0
Those who sponsored the bills disagreed with the Governor and con-
tended that it is essential to have broad representation via mandatory
membership even though the planning agency would have no more
powers than the current associations of governments.
All parties concerned seem to have overlooked the fact that the ef-
fect of mandatory membership can be achieved under the existing asso-
ciation of governments procedure, since a significant number of lo-
cal governments can be coerced into remaining in an association. For
example, although the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los An-
geles desired to withdraw from the Southern California Association of
72. See S.B. 37 and S.B. 776, 1972 Regular Session, §67620(e) (identical bills),
which would have specifically denied the agency power to enact ordinances enforceable
against local agencies or individuals. S.B. 920, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, July
27, 1971, contained a limited enforcement provision when it passed the Senate, but
the provision was amended out of the bill before it passed the Assembly. S.B. 920,
1971 Regular Session, as amended, Oct. 27, 1971. This provision would have required
the submission of the area development plan to each local agency in the region for its
approval. If a local agency approved the plan, it was prohibited from constructing any
public facility or improvement in substantial conflict with the plan.
73. S.B. 37 and S.B. 776, 1972 Regular Session, §67605 (establishing jurisdic-
tion of the agency) and §67607.1 (mandating participation by local agencies).
74. The lack of any provision by the state for financing of regional planning is
an important deficiency in existing law. See Hearings, supra note 66, at 24-25.
75. In the case of the North Coast, Sonoma County wished to withdraw from
the Association of Bay Area Governments, but felt it would do so only if there was a
north coast association which it could join. No such association was or is now in
existence.
In the case of the Southern California Association, many significant cities are not
members, 1971 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE SOUTmRuN CL..FoRNA AssociATON OF
GovRaMENTs, and the County of San Bernardino has threatened to withdraw. See
Hearings, supra note 70, at 73.
76. JouRNAL OF TnE CALr 'oRN SENATE, 9235 (Reg. Sess. 1971).
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Governments, they were forced to remain members because of a threat
of withdrawal of federal grant money if they were no longer mem-
bers.77  Furthermore, even if a local government does withdraw, or
refuses to join, the functioning of the association is not impaired, so
long as the association retains the membership of governments which
represent at least 75 percent of the population of the region.78  Solano
County, for example, has never been a member of the Association of
Bay Area Governments ABAG, yet ABAG performs comprehen-
sive regional planning for that county, reviews and comments upon
its grants, and even receives a contribution equivalent to the amount of
its membership fee by making an in lieu charge for processing Solano's
grant applications. 79  The only difference Solano's nonmembership
makes is that Solano has no voice in the association's affairs, which is
solely to Solano's detriment, not the association's.
It seems reasonable to conclude that, except for possibly providing
a basis upon which a more powerful agency could be built in the fu-
ture, there is little need to create by legislation a purely advisory re-
gional planning agency in any region of the state. Moreover, such an
advisory agency would suffer from most of the drawbacks of the asso-
ciations of governments discussed above relating to resolving the prob-
lems posed by conflicting local and regional planning jurisdictions.
B. Positive Implementation Power
Since regional planning without the existence of an agency which
can enforce the regional plan is of negligible value, it is important that
proposed regional planning agency legislation contain enforcement pro-
visions. This section will consider the two methods of enforcement
which are most often proposed: direct enforcement of the plan by
permit authority, and indirect enforcement of the plan by planning man-
agement.
Some proposed legislation"" and existing laws8' provide for direct
implementation of a regional plan by the regional planning agency.
Usually such authority is given to single-purpose regulatory agencies,
77. Letter from Ray Remy, Executive Director of the Southern California As-
sociation of Governments, to Stephen L. Taber, Oct. 16, 1972, on file at the Pacific Lawv
Journal Office.
78. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development Circular, MPD 6415, 114, at 8,
makes this requirement a prerequisite for sewage treatment and open space grants.
79. Hearings, supra note 66, at 32.
80. S.B. 1368, 1972 Regular Session; S.B. 1400, 1970 Regular Session.
81. E.g., the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, CAL.
GOV'T CODE §66600 et seq., and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, CAL. Gov'T
CODE §66801 et seq.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 4
rather than to multi-purpose agencies.82 Under a permit scheme, pub-
lic or private activity of a specified type (e.g., filling of the Bay, emis-
sions into the atmosphere, construction of a hospital) is prohibited
unless a permit is first obtained from the regional agency. Upon ap-
plication, the regional agency has the power to deny the permit if it
finds that the project is inconsistent with the goals of its regional plan.
Agencies presently exercising direct regulatory powers in enforcing
their regional plans include air pollution control districts8 3 (San Fran-
cisco Bay Area Air Pollution Control District is the only regional
district, the others are county districts), Water Quality Control
Boards,84 Comprehensive Health Planning Councils,"5 and the San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission."
In contrast, under a planning management authority scheme (the
first of which was created under the Tahoe Regional Agency Com-
pact, 7 and which has been proposed for other single and multi-pur-
pose regional planning agencies),88 a regional agency sets a general
policy which is then implemented by other governmental entities. Un-
der this method of enforcement, a regional agency has power to re-
quire that the activities of such entities conform to the regional plan.
An example of planning management is found in the Tahoe com-
pact, which provides that the regional agency is to formulate regula-
tions which are "general and regional in application, leaving to [local
government] the enactment of specific and local ordinances, rules,
regulations, and policies which conform to the [regional plan]."'8 9 The
regional agency has been given the power to initiate a court action to
insure conformity of local ordinances with the regional plan.90
On the other hand, A.B. 1057, introduced but not passed in 1971,
and bills modeled after it,91 provide for administrative, rather than ju-
82. However, A.B. 711, 1969 Regular Session, would have provided for direct
regulation by permit by the comprehensive agency. The effectuation sections of A.B.
220, 1972 Regular Session, A.B. 1057, 1971 Regular Session, and A.B. 2050, 1971
Regular Session, provide that the agency may enact rules and regulations which "must
be complied with by affected private persons." The agency would be able to halt pri-
vate action which is in conflict with the regional plan by a cease and desist order.
However, no permit procedure is set forth nor would one be likely to be developed.
The power to enact rules and regulations has proved to be an effective tool in the
hands of an agency such as the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §24300.
83. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§24368 et seq., 39313.
84. CAL. WATER CODE §§13240, 13242.
85. CAL. HEALTH AND SAmTY CODE §437.7 et seq. Area Health Planning Agency
approval is required before anyone may construct hospitals or related facilities.
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66600 et seq.
87. CAL. GOV'T CODE §66801.
88. A.B. 220, 1972 Regular Session; A.B. 1057, 1971 Regular Session; A.B. 3050,
1971 Regular Session.
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE §66801, art. VI(a).
90. Id., art. IV(b).
91. E.g., A.B. 220, 1972 Regular Session; A.B. 3050, 1972 Regular Session.
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dicial enforcement of conformity. Under the provisions of these bills,
the director of the regional agency sends the local agency a notice
of nonconformity, at which time the local agency must either correct its
ordinance or request a hearing to be held within 90 days. Following
the hearing, the regional board may issue a cease and desist order,
the violation of which may be enjoined by a superior court.
For a planning management scheme to be effective, it should grant
the regional agency control over a broad enough range of local ac-
tivities to allow it to effectively implement its planning goals. Cer-
tainly, the regional agency should be able to require that local planning,
zoning, and subdivision regulation conform to the regional plan. Addi-
tionally, the regional agency should be able to control many other local
government activities, including the establishment and location of
transportation routes, utility services, 92 and schools, because decisions
affecting such local activities very often determine where and to what
extent urban development will occur. Therefore, if legislation were
to give a regional agency power to require conformity of local plans,
ordinances and regulations relating to planning or to the regulation
and control of development, it could justifiably be interpreted as giv-
ing the agency the power to require conformity of all action tending
to influence the direction of urban development, rather than only that
action designed to regulate development.
The advantages of planning management as opposed to direct en-
forcement through permit authority are: (1) it is efficient, in that
only one set of regulations relating to private activity (those of the lo-
cal agency) need be enforced; and (2) it allows the regional policy to
be implemented in a different manner in each local jurisdiction, thus
allowing flexibility in providing for special situations which may arise.
Also, planning management enforcement would escape the permit
authority requirement that each significant development and environ-
mentally important action be submitted to the regional agency for ap-
proval. The necessity for such approval could be an administrative
nightmare and might cause the regional agency to be bogged down in
fine details.
The disadvantages of planning management are several. It does
not allow the regional agency to directly enforce its own regulations,
thereby not allowing it the benefit of fashioning regional policies on a
case-by-case basis. The result is that all detailed planning and all
92. Hearings on Bodega Harbor Subdivision, Before the California Assembly
Committee on Planning and Land Use, Oct. 13, 1971. The Committee investigated
a recreational subdivision which was made possible by the formation of a special district
to provide sewage treatment.
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enforcement occurs at the local level with the regional agency fashion-
ing only a vague and general policy. It may be expected that the local
entities will place their provincial interest above regional considerations
and thus defeat the purpose of regional planning. Furthermore, the
local planning process might not be capable of properly enforcing
the provisions of the regional plan, especially if the regional plan is
very technical in nature.93
Balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods, per-
mit authority and planning management, it seems that direct regula-
tion by permit is probably not necessary to effectuate a general regional
plan if there are competent regulatory agencies already in existence.
For example, the land use plan need not be enforced by a system of re-
gional zoning, building, and subdivision regulations which in turn are
enforced by permit requirements. Such a procedure would not only
come into conflict with the procedure now provided by local agencies,
but would also constitute an extraordinarily large burden on the re-
gional agency. It would also appear completely unnecessary, since
the incorporation of general regional standards into local plans by plan-
ning management is much easier than setting up duplicative regula-
tory systems.
The same is true with regard to matters regulated by single-purpose
regional agencies. It is better to incorporate the standards of the re-
gional general plan into the single-purpose plan (using the umbrella
approach discussed herein) rather than to provide for concurrent reg-
ulation. However, if ever a single-purpose regulatory agency were to
be consolidated with a comprehensive planning agency, the compre-
hensive agency would have to be given the regulatory powers of the
single-purpose agency, including the permit power, since the enforce-
ment responsibility must be vested in some agency. For the same rea-
son, if the comprehensive agency were given the responsibility to
provide planning in an area not occupied by another agency, it would
have to be granted sufficient regulatory power to either effectuate the
plan without the assistance of another agency or to compel some other
agency to assume the responsibility of enforcement.
In conclusion, the nature of the enforcement power granted to a
comprehensive regional planning agency should depend on the nature
of the plan to be enforced. If the plan is general and involves activi-
93. This was a factor in the decisions to give the Vermont Environmental Board
and its regional commissions direct control over most development and all subdivisions
in the state to effectuate the state's land use and development plans. The lack of
sophisticated local controls in the face of increased recreational development was of-
fered as the reason for such strong action by the state. BOSSELMAN AND CALLIES, supra
note 1 at 55.
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ties which are already regulated by another unit of government, plan-
ning management authority is proper. On the other hand, if the plan
is specific and there is no other agency which can adequately enforce
it, permit authority is required. In all cases, the power should be suf-
ficient for enforcement of the regional plan.
Resolving Conflicts among Regional Planning Authorities
The establishment by statute of comprehensive regional agencies
will inevitably create problems of intergovernmental conflict between
the comprehensive regional agency and already existing single-pur-
pose regional agencies. The conflict has not been serious with regard
to the present associations of government because these comprehensive
agencies have had no enforcement authority. However, when such
agencies are given enforcement power, there could be serious con-
flicts with other agencies. There appear to be three methods of resolv-
ing such conflicts.
A. The Umbrella Agency
An umbrella regional planning agency (for purposes of this article)
is an agency without the power to directly enforce its plan, but whose
plan is enforced by single-purpose regional agencies which themselves
have planning and enforcement powers. Such agencies are currently
provided for by law (e.g., water quality control boards, the Bay Con-
servation and Development Commission, air pollution control boards and
coordinating councils, health planning councils and others), each of
which formulates and enforces its own plan for its own functions.
While the purpose of the umbrella agency would not be to absorb this
fractionalized planning and enforcement process, it would provide for
the formulation of a single comprehensive plan-a general develop-
ment guide for the entire region-and it would require the plans and
activities of the regional-single purpose agencies to conform with its
overall plan.
In order for the umbrella agency method to operate, there must be in
existence, regional single-purpose agencies to implement the plan. It
would also seem necessary that, except where sub-regional planning
is needed, the single-purpose agencies have their respective jurisdic-
tions coterminous with that of the umbrella agency, so the single-pur-
pose agencies are able to coordinate their activities effectively with the
comprehensive plan. Unfortunately, however, there is no present
requirement that single-purpose regional planning agency jurisdictions
conform with any uniform standards; consequently, California is at
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present divided in over 100 different ways94 and most of the resulting
regional boundaries do not correspond with any of the others. While
in some cases nonconforming regional divisions are necessitated by
physical characteristics (such as air and water basins), most of the
existing nonconformity is the result of a lack of coordination by those
drawing the boundaries of single-purpose agencies and by a lack of
any requirements for conformity. For example, the California Coun-
cil on Intergovernmental Relations, mandated by state law,95 established
regional planning district boundaries as early as 1965.0 These
boundaries were to be observed by other agencies for purposes of re-
gional planning. However, the districts have seldom been utilized and
no effort has been made to require regional planning to conform to
them.
Only one pure umbrella planning agency has been seriously pro-
posed, and it was never introduced as legislation. This proposal was
an alternative Bay Area regional agency conceived in 1971 by an or-
ganization called Action for a Regional Environmental Agency.
97
The proposed agency9 would have had the power to formulate a re-
gional plan and require that the plans of single-purpose regional ag-
encies conform with that plan. The agency would have had no power
to directly enforce its plan against local agencies or individuals. This
proposal was set aside in favor of A.B. 1057 and was not introduced
because, for political reasons, a bill was needed which would not affect
the organization or financing of existing units of government.
94. California Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Compilation of Regional
Boundaries as Established for Use by State Agencies, Mar. 24, 1971.
95. CAL. GoV'T CoDE §65018.2, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1959, c. 1641, at 4016,
repealed, CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 138, at 327. CAL. Gov'T CODE §34216, enacted, CAL.
STATS. 1969, c. 138, at 325.
96. Minutes of the February 1965 meeting of the California Planning Advisory
Committee, on file with the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations. The
history of regional boundaries in California is recounted in S. Taber, The California
Council on Intergovernmental Relations: An Advisory Agency in Transition 13-16
(1971) (unpublished thesis on file with the office of the Public Administration Pro-
gram, U.C.L.A.).
97. Action for a Regional Environmental Agency is a regional civic organization
composed of business, labor, and education leaders.
98. This proposal (on file with the California Senate Committee on Local Govern-
ment) included the following provisions:
1. Retention of all single-purpose regional agencies and addition of others (e.g.,
open space) when the need arises.
2. The creation of a comprehensive planning umbrella agency with a directly
elected governing body and a complicated interrelationship between the umbrella agency
and the single-purpose agencies.
3. The formulation of a regional plan and the power of the umbrella agency to review
single-purpose agency plans to ensure conformity.
4. Right of appeal by interested parties from decisions of the single-purpose agencies
to the umbrella agency.
5. Consolidation of the staffs of the umbrella agency and the single-purpose agen-
cies under one executive director.
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Other recent regional legislative proposals have fallen short of pro-
viding an umbrella approach because, although they would have left
intact the existing regional planning agencies and would have pro-
vided for the adoption of comprehensive regional plans, they would not
have provided a method of requiring enforcement of such plans by
single-purpose regional planning agencies. 9
B. Consolidated Planning Agency
A consolidated planning agency is one which enacts its plan and en-
forces it directly against individuals and governmental entities at the
local level, without going through a single-purpose regional agency.
A pure consolidated agency would be one which consolidates all re-
gional planning and enforcement into itself (planning here is used to
mean policy planning, rather than purely functional planning). There-
fore, if a totally consolidated planning agency were to be created, sin-
gle-purpose planning agencies would be abolished and their func-
tions would be transferred to the consolidated agency. The agency
would then have the responsibility to develop air pollution control
plans, water quality plans, a San Francisco Bay plan, a compre-
hensive health plan, criminal justice plans, and all other plans which
single-purpose agencies may now prepare. The consolidated agency
would also be given the authority to utilize all of the enforcement pow-
ers currently delegated to single-purpose agencies.
One advantage of the consolidated agency approach is that a truly
comprehensive planning process may be achieved. For example, with
the same agency preparing both the air quality plan and the urban
growth plan, coordination between the plans (to minimize air pollu-
tion through the placement of new development) would be accom-
plished in a way that would be impossible under the umbrella approach
in which the comprehensive agency merely supervises the planning
done by the single-purpose agency.
Another possible advantage is that the consolidation of regional
agencies into one agency, by eliminating some of the duplication of ef-
fort and centralizing certain administrative and other common, ser-
vices now provided separately by each agency, would result in greater
efficiency. While there have been no estimates of the savings which
would be generated by consolidation, they are probably minimal con-
sidering the current low budgets and functional diversity of existing
single-purpose regional agencies.
99. For example, A.B. 220, 1972 Regular Session, and A.B. 1057, 1971 Regular
Session, made no provision for regulation of the single-purpose regional agencies.
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Despite the aforementioned advantages, no legislation has yet been
proposed which would have required the consolidation of all regional
agencies into a comprehensive planning agency. In fact, of the many
recent regional planning bills, only A.B. 1057 in 1971 provided for
the consolidation of any regional single-purpose agencies into a com-
prehensive agency. Under that measure, the proposed comprehensive
agency could have adopted an ordinance terminating the existence of
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, a regional transportation
planning agency, and would have assumed all duties of the commis-
sion.100 In addition, the bill would have required the Bay Area Sew-
age Services Agency (BASSA), which has the responsibility to plan
for and effectuate regional sewage treatment, to merge with any
"multi-functional regional organization which encompasses the entire
region . . . and which has been delegated substantially the same re-
sponsibilities."''1  It is questionable, however, whether the agency
proposed in A.B. 1057 would have complied with this standard, since
it would not have possessed some of the responsibilities possessed by
BASSA such as the responsibility to construct and operate sewage
treatment facilities if local agencies did not comply with its plan.
On the other hand, the agency proposed in A.B. 1057 would have left
intact and would have had no control over many regional planning
agencies, such as the Bay Conservation and Development Commission,
the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, the Bay Area Water
Quality Control Board, the comprehensive health planning agency,
and the various "regional" criminal justice councils.
This lack of consolidation of single-purpose planning into the com-
prehensive agency is indicative of the political and legal obstacles
which have prevented the establishment of a consolidated planning
process. Each single-purpose regional agency which has heretofore
been established has been created to solve a particular problem for a
particular "clientele." For example, those who were concerned about
the filling of San Francisco Bay worked for the establishment of the
Bay Conservation and Development Commission. Now that the Com-
mission is in operation and has shown itself to be successful, its sup-
porters are very reluctant to allow it to be absorbed into a larger ag-
ency which has not yet proved itself. 1' Consequently, many people
believe that it is a better strategy to establish a comprehensive planning
100. A.B. 1057, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, Oct. 26, 1971, at 59.
101. Id.
102. Letter from William D. Evers, Vice Chairman of BCDC and spokesman for
Bay Area conservationists, to Stephen L. Taber, Aug. 11, 1972, on file at the Pacific
Law Journal.
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agency without disturbing the existing regional planning agencies,
and to consider consolidation after the comprehensive agency has be-
come established.
Another obstacle to consolidation could conceivably be the federal
statutory requirements for the organization and composition of some
single-purpose regional planning agencies, which seem to prevent cer-
tain regional planning activities from being assumed by a general
purpose agency. For example, the federal law requires that a com-
prehensive regional health planning agency include representatives
of both providers and consumers of specified health services."0 3 Like-
wise, criminal justice planning councils must consist of representa-
tives of local law enforcement agencies.' 0 4 These federal requirements
are made even more rigid by state law enacted to implement them.0 5
However, despite the appearance of the law, the federal government has
shown itself willing to accept the consolidation of criminal justice and
health planning functions into a general purpose planning agency,
which may then establish general policy so long as matters of a more
technical nature are submitted for final determination to an advisory
committee constituted according to the federal mandates.' There-
fore, consolidation is probably not as infeasible as it initially appears
to be.
Although consolidation of all regional planning functions into one
agency is conceded to be desirable and legally possible, it is not gen-
erally pursued because of the political obstacles. However, if a re-
gional comprehensive agency is to be effective, it must either be con-
solidated with single-purpose agencies, or act as an umbrella agency as
previously described. Although no legislation has ever been introduced
which would have accomplished either alternative, unless final author-
ity over regional conservation and development regulations is granted
exclusively to a comprehensive agency, a chaotic maze of conflicting
regulations will inevitably result. 0 7
103. 42 U.S.C. §246 (1970).
104. 42 U.S.C. §3723 (1970).
105. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §437.7 requires the planning agency to be a
nonprofit corporation.
106. Letter from Lizette Weiss, Public Information Officer of the Association of
Bay Area Governments, to Stephen L. Taber, Oct. 12, 1972, on file at the Pacific Law
Journal.
107. There could conceivably be several regional agencies regulating land use with no
method to resolve conflicts among them. A.B. 1057 would have provided that the
power to regulate land development would belong to at least the following agencies:
1) The Comprehensive Agency
2) The Regional Water Quality Control Board
3) The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
4) The Bay Conservation and Development Commission
5) The Coastal Commissions
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C. Consolidation of Local Government
In the preceding discussion it has been assumed that the structure
of local government would not be affected except insofar as its fune,
tioning would be regulated by the regional plan. However, it has
been contended that the best means to provide for regional planning
would be to consolidate counties or consolidate cities with the coun-
ties in which they are located. Although the general consolidation of
counties has been proposed from time to time in order to provide the
economy of scale lacking in small, rural counties,108 consolidation
as an alternative form of regional government was first proposed in 1969
as a means of coping with the regional problems of the Tahoe Basin.'
Although a hearing was held on the matter by the Senate Committee
on Local Government, consolidation was not pursued further after
the creation of the Tahoe Regional Agency. Tahoe, however, pre-
sents a unique problem because even a consolidated county would
cover only the California side of the basin. Despite the failure of this
proposal for the Tahoe Basin, there has been continuing interest in
county consolidation for other regions of the state."t 0
In order to be presented as an alternative to regional planning ag-
encies, something more than a mere consolidation of counties with
boundaries coterminous with regional boundaries would have to be
proposed. Under existing law, a county has no planning and zon-
ing power over territory within the jurisdiction of its cities"' and has
no power to regulate independent local entities within its jurisdiction." 12
In order to function properly as a regional agency, a consolidated county
would thus have to be granted regulatory powers such as those pro-
posed in this article for regional planning agencies."13
A consolidated county having the powers of a regional planning
108. G. Paschall, The Case for County Consolidation in California (1968) (unpub-lished masters thesis on file in the library of the California State University at Sacra-
mento). See also Bollens, The California Courts: A Relic or a Vital Force? in THE
ROLE OF THE COUNTY I REGIONAL PLANNING. (U.C. Extension, Davis 1964).109. Hearings on County Boundaries, Before the California Senate Commiltee on
Local Government, Apr. 1 & 2, 1969.
110. See notes 119-120 infra.
111. People v. Velarde, 45 Cal. App. 520, 526, 118 P. 59, 61 (1920) ("we shall
assume that none of the police power that the Constitution has directly granted to thecounty can be exercised within the limits of any incorporated city or town in the
county. .. ").
112. The county does, however, have power over the formation of cities (CAL.
GOv'T CoDu §34300 et seq.) and districts (CAL. GOV'T CODE §56291).
113. See text accompanying notes 80-93 supra. This power is not without someprecedent. New York gives counties the power to coordinate zoning of cities where it
impacts on an area outside the city. If the county turns down the zoning of a city, thecity may re-enact the zoning ordinance only by a majority vote following the adoption
of a resolution giving the reasons for taking action contrary to the county's decision.N.Y. GEN. MuNIC. LAW §239(1) (McKinney 1965).
1973 / Prospects for Regional Planning
agency could possibly offer advantages which a regional agency could
not. First, it would eliminate one "layer of government," consoli-
dating the regional level with the county level. This would arguably
result in greater efficiency and visibility of government. Secondly,
regional planning would be done by an agency which would have full
rather than limited powers to implement the planning. Because of
the broad regulatory and taxing authority of a county, it would be able
to do things that no proposed regional agency would be able to do,
such as incur indebtedness, 114 conduct redevelopment and public hous-
ing projects," 5 and carry out other public functions in accord with the
regional plan.
The consolidated county concept does pose some problems, how-
ever. First, counties in metropolitan areas would become extremely
large if they were to encompass entire regions. The Los Angeles con-
solidated county, for example, would have over ten million people" 6
and the San Francisco consolidated county would have over four and a
half million." 7 Next, there would be serious political opposition to
such a drastic change in intergovernmental relations, especially from
cities and special districts which would become subject to the control of
a county. And, finally, consolidation would require a majority vote
in each county,"" which means that one small county could defeat the
entire consolidation.
Nevertheless, while county consolidation is not presently considered
a feasible alternative, the idea is still alive. The California Council on
Intergovernmental Relations presented it as an alternative means of
solving areawide problems in a 1970 report"' and in a 1972 speech,
Governor Reagan appeared to favor the idea.Y Also, the Speaker
114. CAL. Gov'T CODE §29900(b) authorizes a county to issue bonds for "any
purposes for which the board of supervisors is authorized to expend the funds of the
county."
115. A county may activate a housing authority and a redevelopment agency.
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§33101, 34240. The Board of Supervisors may desig-
nate itself as the redevelopment agency or housing authority. Id. §§33200, 34290.
116. On July 1, 1972, the six Southern California Association of Governments coun-
ties had a population of 10,205,400. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ADVANCE
REPORT ON POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (1972).
117. On July 1, 1972, the nine bay area counties had a population of 4,761,100.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, ADVANCE REPORT ON POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR
CALIFORNIA CoUNTIES (1972).
118. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §l(a).
119. CALIFORNIA COUNCIL ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ALLOCATION OF
PUBLIC SERVICES RESPONSIBILrrES 23 (1970).
120. See Excerpts of Remarks by Governor Ronald Reagan, Sacramento Host Break-
fast, Sept. 8, 1972, at 10. The Governor has announced the formation of a "major
task group [which] will have the responsibility of looking at the geographic bound-
aries of California's 58 counties to see if constructive changes might provide better
government at less cost." Excerpts of Remarks by Governor Ronald Reagan, County
Supervisors Association of California 78th Annual Meeting, Palm Springs, Nov. 15,
1972, at 7.
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of the Assembly has appointed a select committee on county bound-
aries (this action, however, was prompted by S.B. 262, which was in-
troduced primarily to split, not consolidate, counties) and the County
Supervisors Association and the California Real Estate Association are
conducting respective studies on government reorganization, includ-
ing cDunty consolidation.
Control of the Planning Process
In California, one of the most controversial issues involved with re-
gional planning is the question of who should control the planning ag-
ency.' 21 The schemes used most often by California and other states
can be broken down into four basic categories: (1) state control
through a department of the state government; (2) control by a com-
mission appointed at the state level; (3) control by a commission ap-
pointed by local agencies within the region; and (4) control by a body
directly elected by the people of the region. A governing board
drawing membership from two or more of the above categories is
also often encountered.
Control of the regional planning process by a department of state
government is not often considered in California, probably because of
the state's strong home rule tradition. 2 2  However, there are many im-
portant functions of regional concern involving state services which are
planned for at the state level.' 23  Although other states have utilized
this procedure for environmental planning and control (including Massa-
chusetts'12 4 and Wisconsin),' 25 regulation is carried out in most states by
an agency separate from the state government administration.
Control of regional planning by a commission with members ap-
pointed at the state level is used to a limited extent in California:
120
the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commmission
has, of its 27 members, four representatives of state agencies, five pub-
lic representatives appointed by the Governor, and one representa-
tive each appointed by the Rules Committee of the Senate and the
121. Scott and Hawley, Organizing to Solve Regional Problems in the San Francisco
Bay Area, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL STMDIES, PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (U.C., Berkeley, Apr. 1968).
122. However, a joint committee of the Legislature has recommended that, as an
alternative to regional government, the state act directly to solve such regional problems
as transportation and solid waste disposal. See Joint Committee on the Organization
and Financing of Local Government, Findings and Recommendations Relating to
Problems of Organizations and Financing of Local Government 31 (Nov. 1972).
123. E.g., highway planning, CAL. SmETS AND H'WAYS CODE §252, and parks
and recreation, CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE §541(e).
124. Wetlands Protection, 130 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. §105 (1958).
125. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1970).
126. See Scorr AND BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 25.
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Speaker of the Assembly;127 regional water quality control boards12
are appointed by the Governor, with the condition that such appointees
must be residents of or have a principal place of business in the region;
and the Tahoe Regional Agency also contains state representatives (one
appointee of the Governor of each state and one department head
from each state in addition to the locally appointed members). 29
Control of regional planning by an agency chosen at the local level
is much more prevalent in California. This trend seems desirable since
California is large in both population and area, and contains four dis-
tinct, large urban regions and several smaller ones. With the existence
of great diversity and differing political attitudes between those re-
gions, it is essential that regional planning be locally controlled. It is
for this reason that all proposals for general purpose regional planning
agencies have contained provisions for control by a board elected or
appointed from within the region.
One method of local selection is the so-called constituent unit form-
ula (whereby members of the governing body are selected by the lo-
cally elected officials of the various counties) based on the ratio of
county population to the total population of the district. This form
of control is widely used throughout California for regional planning
by existing voluntary associations of governments. It is also the pri-
mary basis for selection of the governing bodies of the Bay Conservation
and Development Commission, 3" the Los Angeles-Ventura Mountain
and Coastal Commission, 31 the Tahoe Regional Agency,'32 the Bay
Area Air Pollution Control District 3 (and the basin-wide air pollution
control coordinating councils in the other regions),' the Golden Gate
Bridge and Transportation District,'3 3 and the Bay Area Rapid Transit
District. 36 Additionally, it is the form of control most often proposed
for statutory comprehensive regional planning agencies.
13 7
There are many groups, however, including conservationists 3 and
127. CAL. GOV'T CoDE §66620.
128. CAL. GOV'T CODE §13201.
129. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66801, art. I(a).
130. CAL. Gov'T CODE §66620.
131. CAL. PuB. RESOURCES CODE §22020.
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE §66801, art. HI(a).
133. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§24352, 24352.1.
134. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §39272.
135. CAL. STREETS AND H'VAYS CODE §27122.
136. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §28733.
137. E.g., A.B. 220, 1972 Regular Session; S.B. 37, 1972 Regular Session; S.B. 776,
1972 Regular Session; A.B. 3050, 1971 Regular Session; S.B. 920, 1971 Regular Ses-
sion.
138. Holly O'Konski, President, League of Women Voters of the Bay Area, State-
ment to the Assembly Local Government Committee, Sept. 12, 1972, at 2.
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the real estate industry,13 9 who have reservations about the constituent
unit system. It has been contended that representatives of local ag-
encies would not have the necessary time to devote to regional affairs
and would place provincial interests above regional interests. Addi-
tionally, since the directors would run in local elections on local issues,
this would give the voters no opportunity to express themselves on re-
gional affairs. Finally, because only a portion of the local officials
would be members of the regional governing board, there would be
many citizens of the region without a representative on the governing
board.140 The proposal put forth by conservationists and others is that
the policy-making body of the regional planning agency should be di-
rectly elected by the people of the region. 14  This proposal has
been included in the regional planning agency bills introduced by As-
semblyman Knox in 1970 and 1971142 and resulted in a compromise
between the two systems of local control.
Conclusion
In California virtually no effective action has been taken toward
the development of a regional planning process and the state has thus
essentially abdicated its role in establishing and regulating regional
planning. State legislation is now being proposed, however, which
would establish comprehensive regional planning agencies in several
regions of the state.
In order to provide an adequate structure for meeting the needs of
California regions, this legislation should meet the following criteria:
1. The agency created should be truly comprehensive in that it should
either consolidate into itself the existing single-purpose regional plan-
ning agencies or it should have the power to require such agencies to
conform their plans and activities to the comprehensive regional plan.
2. The agency should possess the power to enforce its plan, either
by direct regulation (permit power) or by requiring other agencies,
either regional or local, to enforce it (planning management).
3. The agency should be controlled from within the region. It
is likely that any legislation introduced will provide for some amount
139. Testimony of Dugald Gillies, California Real Estate Ass'n, in Hearings on
the Southern California Regional Planning Agency, Before the California Senate Com-
mittee on Local Government, Sept. 15, 1972, at 65-66.
140. For the arguments for and against constituent unit representation and direct
election, see Scott and Hawley, supra note 121.
141. Scorr AND BOLLENS, supra note 9, at 26.
142. A.B. 1057, 1971 Regular Session, as amended, Oct. 26, 1971; A.B. 2310, 1970
Regular Session.
1973 / Prospects for Regional Planning
of "constituent unit" representation (that is, a governing body com-
posed of local officials from within the region). However, in order
to insure a broader range of participation and representation, at least
a majority of the governing body should consist of directly elected rep-
resentatives of the public.
Regional planning and land use control are essential because of the
existence of severe environmental problems which cannot be solved by
the present fragmented planning process. It is time for the Leg-
islature to take the initiative in enacting strong regional planning laws.
